You
have distinguished in your works a hermeneutic of archeology and
a hermeneutic of teleology, a reductive hermeneutic
-- for example psychoanalysis -- oriented toward the
regressive, the infantile, the archaic, and an amplifying
hermeneutic -- for example, phenomenology -- attentive to the
surplus of meaning and oriented towards a telos
of
signifying completeness, to
use your expression. How
do you situate this opposition in relation to a hermeneutic of
the work of art?
I
have not pursued that line, which relates to a debate with
psychoanalysis. I
maintained, on the one hand, that the domain of psychoanalysis
was hollowed out from underneath, from behind in some way,
moving always toward the most primitive, the most archaic, the
most savage, the most inchoative, and, on the other hand, that
meaning is complete only when the figures of Spirit surpass each
other by a sort of repetition oriented towards a something more.
I had taken the example of the Phenomenology
of Spirit of Hegel because we have there the model of an
understanding where the meaning of one figure is in the
following figure. The
connection of one figure to the other appears contingent, but
once the following figure has appeared, it becomes retroactively
necessary. It would
appear inscribed in the preceding figure that the following will
be such as it is. This
then permits certainly a playing out of a dialectic which I have
called in the past the dialectic of suspicion and amplification,
but I am not sure that it is universal.
I applied it to the most favorable case, that of the Oedipus
Rex of Sophocles: its
meaning does not reduce to the drama of sexuality, of incest and
parricide; but it proceeds from the history of recognition: that
is the tragedy of truth, therefore both of retrospection toward
the origin, but also the march ahead towards enlightenment,
towards catharsis, illumination
(I think besides that it is necessary to translate catharsis
by enlightenment as much as by purification in the medical or
mystical sense of the word).
So, hermeneutic comprehension consists perhaps in this
capacity, in the course of the history of understanding, to
engender new meaning in favor of this movement of archeology
towards teleology. In
its turn this movement would come to be surmounted in the
transhistorical of the perennial, of perdurance.
Such would be the persistence of the work of art, capable
each time of engendering the surpassing of archeology in
teleology.
Are
you not
then on the way to pointing out the mystery of creation and of
arts as interpretation of the world? One has been able to
inerpret the work of art in a reductionist manner as refraction,
product, reflex, mimesis, etc., of what exists already, and so
we have all the sociological or anthropological theories which
lead the work of art back to the conditions of its production:
the market, habit, the social field, the socio-cultural
environment, impulses, even the air of the time or the style.
Thus the work of art would be the expression of what
already exists. There
you have archeology. It
would seem that you are rather in the inverse position, that of
teleology, where the work of art is an end, an ahead, a project
to make happen in the sense understood by Ernst Bloch.
To
return to Kant, it is striking to see that he was very severely
at a loss to situate genius in relation to the beautiful and the
sublime, because there always remains something of the
retrospective in the judgment of taste, whereas the beautiful
creates anew. I am
interested in this problem, either by way of
metaphor or else from narrative, within the theme of
semantic innovation. In
both cases, the idea emerges of a new meaning which had not been
there. Thus
metaphor is the capacity to produce a new meaning, at the
flash-point where a semantic incompatibility founders in the
confrontation of several levels of signification, to produce a
new signification which exists only in the breaking up of the
semantic fields. In
the case of narrative, I would risk saying that what I call the
synthesis of the heterogeneous does not create any less novelty
than metaphor, but this time in the composition, in the
configuration of a narrated temporality, of a narrative
temporality. To
join together multiple events, causalities, finalities and
contingencies, is to produce a new meaning which is the plot
Each plot is singular and has
exactly the status of the work of art according to Kant: the
singularity capable of being shared.
Would
you go so far as to extend this metaphorical function of art to
all the forms of art? This is what you seem to be
suggesting in saying that the work of art can have an effect
comparable to that of metaphor: to integrate levels of
meaning accumulated, retained
and contained together. Can one
extend the
notion of
metaphor beyond
the trope?
Beyond language properly
so-called?
Beyond language but also beyond period figures. What one
can keep perhaps of the generalized metaphor, beyond language
and the trope, is resemblance, but resemblance as a product of
metaphor. Metaphor does not repeat a given resemblance,
but by the fact that it produces meaning, it creates resemblance
where there was none. In sum, there is a generation of
resemblance. One of the very beautiful texts which I have
commented on on another occasion, The
Poetics of Aristotle, underscores
this: to make metaphors well is to have an insight into
resemblance. This insight into resemblance allows one to read
resemblance where one did not see it. In sum it creates a
resemblance which one can no longer not see. |